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ABSTRACT
The tax code is designed to raise government revenue. Domestic
support obligations (DSOs)—namely, child support and spousal
support—are designed to ameliorate the financial burdens that
arise upon divorce. To determine the amount of domestic support
obligations, statutes often refer to commonly used taxation
concepts, such as “income.”
Courts determining domestic support obligations have been
confronted with the question of how to treat “phantom income”—
that is, amounts that are includible as gross income under the
federal tax code but that have not resulted in any actual current
cash receipt. Individuals obligated to make domestic support
payments have argued that phantom income should not be included
when calculating or modifying such obligations because the
individual’s ability to pay has not materially changed. This Article
analyzes the intersection of federal tax law and domestic support
obligations concerning phantom income.
This Article considers several solutions—judicial and
legislative—to address the phantom income issue in the domestic
support context. Notably, this Article evaluates the current judicial
decisional framework to examine the potential tax and DSO
asymmetries. Finally, this Article advances a legislative proposal
for a charging-order type remedy specific to domestic support
obligations—one that would resolve the phantom income issue in
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many situations.

I. INTRODUCTION
The tax code is designed to raise government revenue.
Domestic support obligations, or DSOs—namely child
support and spousal support—are intended to ameliorate the
financial burdens that arise upon divorce or separation. To
determine the amount of domestic support obligations,
statutes often refer to commonly used taxation concepts,
such as “income.”
Courts determining the amount of domestic support
obligations have been confronted with the question of how to
treat “phantom income”—that is, amounts that are
includible as income under the federal tax code but that have
not resulted in any actual current cash receipt.
Consequently, individuals obligated to make domestic
support payments have argued that phantom income should
not be included when calculating such obligations because
the individual’s ability to pay has not materially changed.
This Article analyzes the intersection of federal tax law and
domestic support obligations concerning phantom income.
This Article proposes several solutions—judicial and
legislative—to address the phantom income issue in the
domestic support context. Notably, this Article evaluates the
current judicial decisional framework to examine the
potential tax and DSO asymmetries. This Article will also
advance a legislative proposal for a charging-order type
remedy specific to domestic support obligations—one that
would resolve the phantom income issue in many situations.
II. BACKGROUND
A domestic support obligation1 is an umbrella term

1. In the Bankruptcy Code, for example, a “domestic support obligation” is
defined as follows:
a debt . . . that is—
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generally used to refer to two types of support: (1) spousal
support (or alimony) and (2) child support.
A. Spousal Support and Alimony
Spousal support or alimony is “an allowance for support
and maintenance, having no other purpose and provided for
no other object”;2 it is “a substitute for marital support.”3 It
is “designed to compensate the spouse who is economically
disadvantaged through her or his role in the marriage and
not to equalize income in every circumstance.”4 The historic
(A) owed to or recoverable by—
(i) a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s
parent, legal guardian, or responsible relative; or
(ii) a governmental unit;
(B) in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support (including
assistance provided by a governmental unit) of such spouse, former
spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent, without regard
to whether such debt is expressly so designated;
(C) established or subject to establishment before, on, or after the
date of the order for relief in a case under this title, by reason of
applicable provisions of—
(i) a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property
settlement agreement;
(ii) an order of a court of record; or
(iii) a determination made in accordance with applicable
nonbankruptcy law by a governmental unit; . . . .
11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2012).
2. Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N.Y. 566, 569 (1892). As explained by the court
in Romaine:
Like the alimentum of the civil law, from which the word was evidently
derived, it respects a provision for food, clothing and a habitation, or the
necessary support of the wife after the marriage bond has been severed;
and since what is thus necessary has more or less of relation to the
condition, habit of life, and social position of the individual, it is graded
in the judgment of a court of equity somewhat by regard for these
circumstances, but never loses its distinctive character.
Id. at 569–70.
3. Warner v. Warner, 17 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn. 1944).
4. MARIAN F. DOBBS, DETERMINING CHILD & SPOUSAL SUPPORT § 3:1, Westlaw
(Database updated Aug. 2018).
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rationale is that a homemaker’s inward focus—i.e., on the
home and the children—may leave him or her at a
disadvantage in the modern workforce.5 Consequently,
courts and legislatures have devised different types of
spousal support to ameliorate this disadvantage. The
common thread, though, is for spousal support to “provide a
sum for such period of time as needed to maintain the spouse
in the manner to which the spouse was accustomed during
the marriage, balanced against the other spouse’s ability to
pay.”6
There are three general types of alimony:7 (1) temporary
alimony,8 (2) permanent alimony, and (3) rehabilitative
alimony.9 Temporary alimony “is designed to assist the
claimant spouse in sustaining the same style or standard of
living that he or she enjoyed while residing with the other
spouse, pending the litigation of the divorce.”10 Permanent
alimony is designed generally for “a spouse who is
disadvantaged through marriage [to] be enabled to enjoy a
standard of living commensurate with that during the
marriage.”11 Stated otherwise, the “central objective of
alimony is, subject to the availability of resources,
maintenance of the more dependent spouse in an economic
style close to which the spouse had become accustomed
during the marriage.”12 Rehabilitative alimony “allows a

5. Id.
6. Blank v. Blank, 389 S.E.2d 723, 724 (Va. 1990).
7. This even varies by state. For example, Florida has six types of alimony.
DOBBS, supra note 4, § 3:3 (describing Florida’s temporary, bridge, lump sum,
rehabilitative, durational, and permanent alimony regime).
8. This may also be referred to as alimony pendente lite or interim support,
among other terms. 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 579, Westlaw
(database updated Feb. 2019).
9. Id. § 570.
10. Speight v. Speight, 2003-1152 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/4/04); 866 So. 2d 344, 346.
11. In re Marriage of Schuster, 586 N.E.2d 1345, 1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
12. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 595 N.E.2d 792, 793 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); see
also Lentz v. Lentz, 660 So. 2d 1012, 1013 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (“The purpose of
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party needing assistance to become self-supporting without
becoming destitute in the interim.”13 Indeed, its purpose is
“to enable the disadvantaged spouse to acquire additional job
skills, education, or training that will enable him or her to be
more self-sufficient.”14 Thus, rehabilitative alimony is a
temporary measure.
Spousal support is calculated differently from state to
state, but there are some common themes. Most calculations
include a variety of factors15—for example, the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act provides for courts to consider the
duration of the marriage; the age, emotional, and physical
condition of the parties; and the ability of the payor-spouse
to meet his or her own needs.16 Other common factors across
the states include the duration of the marriage;17 the parties’
standard of living;18 the payee’s noneconomic contributions
to the marriage;19 impairment of the payee’s earning
capacity;20 the value of contributions allowing the payor to
increase earning capacity;21 the health of the parties; the age

periodic alimony is to preserve the status the parties enjoyed during the
marriage.”).
13. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 656 So. 2d 124, 130 (Miss. 1995); see also DOBBS,
supra note 4, § 3:1.
14. Anderton v. Anderton, 988 S.W.2d 675, 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); DOBBS,
supra note 4, § 3:1.
15. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993);
Scherer v. Scherer, 2015 S.D. 32, ¶ 10, 864 N.W.2d 490, 494; Richardson v.
Richardson, 2008 UT 57, ¶ 6, 201 P.3d 942, 943; 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and
Separation, supra note 8, § 667; DOBBS, supra note 4, § 3:3.
16. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 308 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS 1974).
17. See, e.g., Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1280.
18. DOBBS, supra note 4, § 3:3.
19. See, e.g., 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 628, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2019).
20. See Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1280.
21. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 4, § 3.35 (“Spouses who obtain additional
education or training during the marriage clearly benefit by an increase in their
lifetime earning potential.”).
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of the parties;22 and the fault, if any, of the parties.23
B. Child Support
Parents have an absolute duty to provide for their
children.24 This duty emanates from both the common law
and state statutes.25 The Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601
called for the imprisonment of fathers who failed to care for
their children.26 Indeed, “[p]arental support is a fundamental
right of all minor children . . . . The right of support is
inherent and cannot be waived, even by agreement.”27 As
deftly stated by the Kansas Child Support Guidelines:
The purpose of child support is to provide for the needs of the child.
The needs of the child are not limited to direct needs for food,
clothing, school, and entertainment. Child support is also to be used
to provide for housing, utilities, transportation, and other indirect
expenses related to the day-to-day care and well-being of the child.28

Although child support is for the sole benefit of the child,
it is paid to the custodial parent.29 The recipient custodial
parent, moreover, holds those funds as a fiduciary for the

22. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1280; see also Kosobud v. Kosobud, 2012 ND 122,
¶ 17, 817 N.W.2d 384, 393 (“A spousal support obligor’s nearing the age of
retirement does not immunize the obligor from paying spousal support.”).
23. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1280.
24. E.g., 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 867.
25. Id.
26. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES (STATUTES), 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS:
FAMILY LAW: CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT (2017), Westlaw 0080 Surveys 4a
[hereinafter CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES SURVEY].
27. Abel v. Abel, 824 So. 2d 767, 768 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (quoting Ex parte
Univ. of South Alabama, 541 So. 2d 535, 537 (Ala. 1989)).
28. KAN. SUPREME COURT, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 2 (2012).
29. See, e.g., State ex rel. Shellhouse v. Bentley, 666 So. 2d 517, 518 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1995) (“Although child support is paid to the custodial parent, it is for the
sole benefit of the minor children.”); Howard v. Howard, 2006-CA-00350-COA
(¶ 24) (Miss. 2007), 968 So. 2d 961, 972 (“Though child support payments are
made to the custodial parent, the payments are for the benefit of the child.”).
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child30—a duty that has been compared to that of trustee.31
The determination of child support rests with the discretion
of the court.32 The court must “determine a support amount
that best balances the child’s needs and the parent’s ability
to pay[.]”33 Nevertheless, “[t]he court’s paramount concern
when awarding child support is the best interest of the
[child].”34
Child support determinations generally start with
prescribed guidelines.35 Normally, these guidelines set child
support as a percentage of an income figure—for example,
gross monthly income.36 Thus, determining items and
amounts of income are paramount.37 Courts can depart from
the guidelines for a variety of factors,38 such as special needs,
the available support from other family members, and other

30. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 518 (2019); Holmes v. Wooley, 792 A.2d
1018, 1021 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001); 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra
note 8, § 867.
31. Holmes, 792 A.2d at 1021 (“It is an interest akin to a trustee’s interest in
the corpus of a trust.”); Shipman v. N.Y.C. Support Collection Unit, 703 N.Y.S.2d
389, 394 (2000) (“[T]he child’s custodial parent[ ] stands as trustee of the funds,
administering money as she deems appropriate for the needs and welfare of the
child.”); Davidson v. Naranjo, 904 P.2d 354, 356 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Cranston
v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo. 1994) (“A support payment is the children’s
money administered in trust by [the custodial parent] for their benefit.”)).
32. 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, §§ 868, 884.
33. Ga. Dep’t of Human Resources v. Prater, 630 S.E.2d 145, 147 (Ga. Ct. App.
2006); see also 24A AM. JUR. 2D DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, supra note 8, § 884.
34. Stiles v. Stiles, 632 S.E.2d 607, 611 (Va. Ct. App. 2006); see also L.C.S. v.
S.A.S., 453 S.E.2d 580, 584 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (“In setting an award of child
support, the ‘primary issue before a trial judge is the welfare and best interests
of the child, not the convenience or personal preference of a parent.’” (quoting
Brody v. Brody, 432 S.E.2d 20, 22 (Va. Ct. App. 1993))).
35. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.30 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4 (2018); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-108.2 (2018); see also CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES SURVEY, supra note
26.
36. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2.
37. See, e.g., LAURA W. MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES INTERPRETATION
& APPLICATION § 4.02 (2018), Westlaw CSGIA.
38. See generally 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 888.
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considerations.39 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, for
example, requires courts to consider the financial resources
of the custodial parent, the standard of living the child would
have had but for the divorce, and the child’s educational
needs, among other things.40 Although courts are not bound
by such guidelines, they often serve as rebuttable
presumptions to the correct amount.41
C. Modifying Domestic Support Obligations
Spousal support is typically determined at the time the
court enters the dissolution or divorce decree.42 If a spouse is
not entitled to support at that time, normally there is no
second bite at the eligibility apple.43 However, if a spouse is
awarded support, it is not uncommon for the support award
to be modified later in light of a change in circumstances.44
The ability to modify support is normally based on an express
statutory grant.45
Typically, spousal support is subject to modification on
“showing of materially changed circumstances.”46 In the
absence of changed circumstances, “a motion for modification

39. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1.
40. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 309 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS 1974).
41. E.g., Brooks v. Rogers, 445 S.E.2d 725, 728 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); see also
24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 887.
42. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 4, § 3:1.
43. See, e.g., id. (“There is no statutory authority for the trial court to
reevaluate, postpone, or defer its determination of whether a spouse meets the
statutory criteria based on a decision or act of an outside entity that occurs after
the final dissolution decree has been entered.”).
44. See, e.g., id. § 6:1.
45. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-327 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.370
(2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (2018).
46. Ramsdell v. Ramsdell, 454 N.W.2d 522, 524 (N.D. 1990); see also Blaufuss
v. Ball, 305 P.3d 281, 285 (Alaska 2013) (“Generally, modification of a support
order is warranted only after a party shows a material and substantial change in
circumstances.”); Street v. Street, 480 S.E.2d 112, 116 (Va. Ct. App. 1997); DOBBS,
supra note 4, § 6:1.
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is nothing more than an impermissible collateral
attack . . . .”47 The changed circumstances, moreover, must
be more than temporary.48 Because support is based on the
parties’ needs and ability to pay, the modification analysis
focuses on those elements.49 Although ability to pay is a
factor, it generally cannot be the sole basis for an increase.50
The standards used to determine any modification are
generally the same standards used to set the original
award.51 Other factors include, for example, a serious health
or physical impairment (and the attending medical
expenses).52 If, on the other hand, the supported spouse’s
circumstances change—for example, if he or she obtains new
employment after divorce—that may be a basis for a
reduction in support.53 Often, remarriage is an agreed-upon
ground to terminate or reduce support payments.54 Spousal
support modifications rest within the trial court’s
47. In re Marriage of Smith, 225 Cal. App. 3d 469, 480 (1990).
48. See generally 32 AM. JUR. 2D 491 Proof of Facts § 6, Westlaw (database
updated Feb. 2019); M. L. Cross, Change in Financial Condition or Needs of
Husband or Wife as Grounds for Modification of Decree for Alimony or
Maintenance, 18 A.L.R.2d 10 § 4.
49. 32 AM. JUR. 2D 491 Proof of Facts § 6, Westlaw (database updated Feb.
2019).
50. See, e.g., Sheridan v. Sheridan, 267 A.2d 343, 346–47 (D.C. 1970) (“The
criteria by which support payments can be decreased are not applicable in a
motion to increase. A motion to increase must be founded on the increased needs
of the children. Indeed, the father’s ability to pay is relevant in granting or
denying the increase, but it is not the basis on which an increase is initiated or
founded.”).
51. 32 AM. JUR. 2D 491 Proof of Facts, supra note 49, § 6.
52. 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 701. See, e.g., 32
AM. JUR. 2D 491 Proof of Facts, supra note 49, § 9.
53. 32 AM. JUR. 2D 491 Proof of Facts, supra note 49, § 9; 24A AM. JUR. 2D
Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 701.
54. 32 AM. JUR. 2D 491 Proof of Facts, supra note 49, § 10 (“It is quite common
to provide, in an agreement between the parties, the decree, or both, that
remarriage of the supported spouse will terminate support provided in regular
periodic payments.”); 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 701
(“The remarriage of a dependent spouse is a consideration for modifying a support
obligation . . . .”).
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discretion.55 It may be possible, in limited jurisdictions, for
the parties to contractually limit the ability to modify
support payments.56
Modifying child support is similar to modifying spousal
support;57 it is based generally on a “material change in
circumstances occur[ing] after the decree.”58 Moreover, “[t]he
change must be one that cannot have been reasonably
anticipated at the time of the original decree and one that
reasonably affects the parties’ ability to abide by the original
decree.”59 As with spousal support, “[t]he court may consider
the parties’ relative financial condition and earning
capacities in determining whether a material change in
circumstances has occurred.”60
D. Federal Tax Background
The federal tax code levies an individual income tax on
individual taxable income.61 Taxable income is defined as
55. Wall v. Wall, 611 So. 2d 1107, 1108 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (“[W]e note that
alimony and child support modifications are matters that rest within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse
of that discretion.”); Keller v. O’Brien, 652 N.E.2d 589, 594 (Mass. 1995) (“We
generally defer to the probate judge’s sound discretion in determining whether
modification of an alimony judgment is appropriate.”). See generally 24A AM. JUR.
2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 693.
56. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Aronow, 480 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991)
(“Parties can contract and dissolution courts can provide alimony is not
modifiable, does not terminate on remarriage, or is payable in a lesser sum on
remarriage.”); 32 AM. JUR. 2D 491 Proof of Facts, supra note 49, § 2. The Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, moreover, provides that “[e]xcept for terms concerning
the support, custody, or visitation of children, the decree may expressly preclude
or limit modification of terms set forth in the decree if the separation agreement
so provides.” UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 306(f) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1974).
57. See, e.g., 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 944.
58. Howard v. Howard, 2006-CA-00350-COA (¶ 24) (Miss. 2007), 968 So. 2d
961, 972.
59. Id. (citing Poole v. Poole, 96-CA-01124-SCT (¶¶ 19, 21) (Miss. 1997), 701
So. 2d 813, 818).
60. Howard, 968 So. 2d at 972.
61. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(e) (2012).
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gross income less allowed deductions.62 The Code has many
provisions that subsidize socially beneficial behavior or
promote desirable social policy, such as home ownership63 or
higher education.64
Undoubtedly, this is true in the family context.
Historically, the Code has provided incentives for marriage,65
child-rearing,66 and dependent care,67 among others. The
Code also recognizes that not all marriages will last until
death, and consequently, it provides special rules for
property distributions upon divorce,68 and—more relevant to
this Article—provides for the tax treatment of alimony and
support payments.69 This section will explore the taxation of
alimony both before and after the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
(TCJA),70 which dramatically changed the taxation of
alimony.
Before the TCJA, in a nutshell, the Code allowed the
payor a deduction for alimony payments71 and required the
payee to include the same.72 Under the Code, alimony
requires (1) a payment in cash, (2) that is received by (or on
behalf of) a spouse (or former spouse), (3) under a divorce or
separation instrument, (4) that is not disclaimed as alimony,
62. Id. § 63(a).
63. See, e.g., id. § 121 (excluding from gross income the gain from certain
home sales); id. § 163(h) (allowing a deduction for qualified residence interest).
64. See, e.g., id. §§ 25A, 222, 529. See generally F. Philip Manns, Jr. &
Timothy M. Todd, Higher Education Savings and Planning: Tax and Nontax
Considerations, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 343 (2018).
65. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1 (combined tax table for married filing jointly).
66. See, e.g., id. § 152 (dependency exemption).
67. See, e.g., id. § 21.
68. See, e.g., id. § 1041.
69. See, e.g., id. § 71, repealed by Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub.L. 115-97,
§ 11051(b)(1)(B), 131 Stat. 2054, 2089 (2017); I.R.C. § 215, repealed by Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act, Pub.L. 115-97, § 11051(a) 131 Stat. 2054, 2089 (2017).
70. Tax Cuts and Job Act, Pub. L. 115-97 § 11001, 131 Stat. 2054, 2055 (2018).
71. I.R.C. § 215.
72. Id. § 71(a).
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(5) and that there is no liability to make a payment after the
death of the payee spouse.73 If the individuals are legally
separated, moreover, they cannot be members of the same
household for a payment to be considered alimony.74
On the other hand, no deduction is allowed and no
inclusion is required for child-support payments.75 For childsupport payments, the law presumes a parental obligation to
support a child to the age of majority notwithstanding
divorce. Consequently, in the pre-TCJA divorce context,
much planning went into the proper structuring and
negotiation of alimony and support payments—just from a
federal taxation perspective, not to mention the actual
economic consequences of such payments. However, under
the TCJA, alimony is no longer deductible by the payor.
Other tax concepts are relevant, too, because many state
domestic-support statutes refer to familiar tax concepts, such
as “income.” In the tax context, gross income, as famously
elucidated by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass,76 means “undeniable accessions to wealth,
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete
dominion.”77 Consequently, gross income can include noncash transactions or items that may not strike the ordinary
person as taxable, such as bargain sales,78 barter
transactions,79 or prizes.80
E. Phantom Income
The term phantom income is used colloquially when a

73. Id. § 71(b)(1)(A)–(D).
74. Id. § 71(b)(1)(C).
75. See id. § 71(c).
76. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
77. Id. at 431.
78. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(2) (2018).
79. E.g., Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60.
80. I.R.C. § 74.
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taxpayer receives taxable income but does not presently
receive cash or other tangible economic benefits.81 Simply
put, phantom income is having to pay taxes on something
without receiving, at that time, any commensurate asset
with which to pay those taxes. In an individual and family
context, phantom income can arise from a variety of sources,
such as business pass-through income, discharge of
indebtedness, and original issue discount.
1. Business Pass-Through Income
Business pass-through income is the paradigmatic type
of phantom income. Generally, partnerships and S
corporations do not pay income taxes at the entity level.82
Rather, the net income of the entity is allocated to the entity
owners,83 who then report that income on their individual tax
returns.84 The entity reports the income allocation to the
owners (and sends a copy to the IRS) via Schedule K-1.85
Although an entity may have positive net income (from
a tax perspective) that it reports to the owners, that does not
necessarily mean that the owners have received that same
amount of cash during the year. In other words, the concepts
of accounting (taxable) income and cash flow are not
synonymous. For example, an S corporation that has
generated positive net taxable income—which the owners
81. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture
Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 874, 902 (2003) (noting that phantom income is “income that is taxable
before any cash is received”).
82. I.R.C. § 701 (for partnerships); id. § 1366 (2012 & Supp. 2018) (for S
corporations)—although some recent developments in partnership taxation can
make it such that the partnership, as an entity, has an affirmative payment
obligation. See, e.g., RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
§ 17:19, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2018).
83. Id. § 702 (2012); id. § 1366.
84. Id. § 61.
85. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, U.S. INCOME TAX
RETURN FOR AN S CORPORATION FORM 1120S (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f1120s.pdf; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, SCHEDULE K-1
(2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1065sk1.pdf.

378

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

must report on their individual returns—may decide to not
pay any dividends so that it can reinvest the cash in the
business and expand it. In this case, the owners will have to
report that taxable income on their individual tax returns,
yet the business has distributed no cash to them with which
to pay that resulting tax liability. This is phantom income.
Indeed, it is entirely possible that the owner may never see
any cash from the enterprise, despite annual individual
income-tax obligations arising from the entity. It may be the
case, too, for the owner to receive some cash from the entity,
but not enough to satisfy the tax obligation.86
2. Cancellation of Debt Income
In the individual and family context, another common
tax issue related to phantom income is discharge of
indebtedness, colloquially known as cancellation of debt
(COD) income. COD income arises when an outstanding debt
is satisfied (or forgiven) at less than face value. This principle
is made clear by the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Kirby Lumber Company.87
In that case, Kirby Lumber issued bonds for which it
received the par value in exchange; later that same year, it
was able to buy back the bonds at less than par, saving more
than $100,000.88 Holding that the savings constituted gross
income, the Supreme Court explained: “Here there was no
shrinkage of assets and the taxpayer made a clear gain. As a
result of its dealings it made available $137,521.30 [in]
assets previously offset by the obligation of bonds now
extinct.”89
One rationale advanced in support of taxable COD
86. Planning, therefore, is paramount with pass-through entities to ensure
that the owners protect themselves against this phenomenon. This is normally
achieved via required “tax distributions” that are drafted as part of a
shareholders’ agreement or operating agreement.
87. 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
88. Id. at 2.
89. Id. at 3.
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income is the “freeing of assets” theory. As explained by the
Ninth Circuit, “[u]nder this theory, a taxpayer realizes gain
when a debt is discharged because after the discharge the
taxpayer has fewer liabilities to offset her assets. The
taxpayer’s existing assets, which otherwise would have gone
toward repaying the debt, are freed.”90 Congress statutorily
embraced Kirby Lumber in 1954 by adding section 61(a)(12),
which codified the inclusion of COD income.
3. Below-Market Loans and Original Issue Discount
Phantom income in the individual context also
encompasses original-issue discount and “interest-free”
loans. The contemporary tax code91 generally does not
recognize interest-free loans: The Code requires a loan to
have adequate stated interest, and if it does not, the Code
will “impute” (create) an interest element.92 Section 7872
applies to “below-market loans,” which are defined, in effect,
as loans with either no stated interest or interest that is
payable at a rate less than the applicable Federal rate.93
As deftly explained by the Joint Committee on Taxation,
Loans that are subject to [Section 7872] . . . are recharacterized as
an arm’s-length transaction in which the lender made a loan to the
borrower in exchange for a note requiring the payment of interest
at the applicable Federal rate. This rule results in the parties being
treated as if: (1) The borrower paid interest to the lender that may
be deductible to the borrower and is included in income by the
lender; and (2) The lender (a) made a gift subject to the gift tax (in

90. Merkel v. Comm’r, 192 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1999).
91. Historically, the Tax Court allowed interest-free loans, with no
corresponding income imputation. In Dean v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held:
We have heretofore given full force to interest-free loans for tax
purposes, holding that they result in no interest deduction for the
borrower nor interest to the lender. We think it to be equally true that
an interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower[.]
35 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1961), nonacq. (citations omitted). Section 7872, however,
now disallows this result. See I.R.C. § 7872 (2012).
92. See I.R.C. § 7872.
93. Id. § 7872(e).
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the case of a gratuitous transaction), or (b) paid a dividend or made
a capital contribution (in the case of a loan between a corporation
and a shareholder), or (c) paid compensation (in the case of a loan
to a person providing services). . . .94

Although the specific contours and applications to belowmarket loans and original-issue discounts are complex—and
beyond the scope of this Article—the main point is that the
imputation could result in taxable income without
necessarily producing a corresponding cash inflow.
III. THE ISSUE OF PHANTOM INCOME IN DOMESTIC SUPPORT
CALCULATIONS
The issue addressed by this Article is how parties and
courts treat phantom income when there is no cash inflow
with which to fund increased domestic support obligations.
In some cases, a spouse seeking an increased support
adjustment may achieve only a Pyrrhic victory if he or she
invests time and money in domestic support litigation,
prevails in court, and then finds out that the payor has no
actual cash to fund that judgment. As the next section
demonstrates, also problematic is the fact that phantom
income is not treated uniformly by courts.
A. Judicial Survey
Courts have reached divergent conclusions on whether
to include phantom income in domestic support obligations.
This section surveys the cases that have expressly wrestled
with the intersection of phantom income and domestic
support obligations.
1. Kelley v. Kelley
In Kelley, the payee-parent challenged the trial court’s
calculation of child support, arguing that it abused its
94. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GEN. EXPLANATION OF
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 528–29 (Joint
Comm. Print 1985); see also J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUAL INCOME 848–49 (12th ed. 2018).
THE
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discretion.95 The payor-parent was a recruiter for a financial
services firm; a part of his compensation package was an
interest-free loan.96 The firm, though, forgave a portion of the
loan, and consistent with tax principles, reported the loan
forgiveness as compensation.97
The trial court classified the loan forgiveness amounts as
“phantom income” because “the money was previously
received and spent, plus [the payee] is not receiving any
compensation, that is, dollars for it.”98 The trial court, then,
did not include loan forgiveness from gross income in its
child-support calculations.99
On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals started with
the child-support statute, which defines “gross income”:
“Gross income” includes income from any source, except as excluded
in this subsection, and includes but is not limited to income from
salaries, wages, retirement and pension funds, commissions,
bonuses, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income,
annuities, capital gains, Social Security benefits, workers’
compensation benefits, unemployment insurance benefits,
disability insurance benefits, Supplemental Security Income (SSI),
gifts, prizes, and alimony or maintenance received. 100

The court, commenting on this definition, remarked,
“[o]bviously, the statute does not specifically address
whether loan forgiveness is income, and further, no
Kentucky case has addressed this question.”101 The court
asserted that “the loan forgiveness amount was not actual
income but was merely listed for purposes of income tax.”102
95. Kelley v. Kelley, No. 2012-CA-002213-MR, 2014 WL 5359745, at *3 (Ky.
Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2014).
96. Id.
97. Id. at *4; see also I.R.C. § 108 (2012).
98. Kelley, 2014 WL 5359745, at *4.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *5 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.212(2)(b)).
101. The tax code, for instance, would include loan forgiveness implicit in the
word “income.”
102. Kelley, 2014 WL 5359745, at *5 (emphasis added).
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The appeals court reasoned that tax statutes and child
support serve different purposes;103 therefore, a “wholesale”
adoption of the taxable income104 concept was not
necessary.105 Consequently, the child-support statute’s
definition of gross income did not include compensatory loan
forgiveness because it was an “in-kind benefit.”106
2. Rieger v. Rieger
The same issue—the treatment of compensatory
forgivable loans in calculating child support—recently
confronted a Virginia Circuit Court. This case also involved
a forgivable loan made by a financial services employer.
Unlike the Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, in Rieger v.
Rieger, the Fairfax County Circuit Court held that a
forgivable loan is includible in gross income for child-support
purposes.107
The court started with the family law statutory
definition of gross income, namely, “all income from all
sources”—
and shall include, but not limited to, income from salaries, wages,
commissions, royalties, bonuses, dividends, severance pay,
pensions, interest, trust income, annuities, capital gains, social
security…workers’
compensation
benefits,
unemployment
insurance benefits, disability insurance benefits, veterans’ benefits,
spousal support, rental income, gifts, prizes or awards. 108

The court concluded that neither the express text of the
statute nor its legislative history provided insight into

103. Id. (quoting Snow v. Snow, 24 S.W.3d 668, 672 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000)).
104. This is a poor choice of words; taxable income and gross income are two
different things. Something can be gross income as defined by section 61 (i.e., an
accession to wealth), yet be statutorily excluded elsewhere in the tax code for
myriad economic, administrative, and public policy reasons (e.g., gifts, fringe
benefits, etc.). See, e.g., I.R.C. § 102 (2012) (gifts); id. § 132 (fringe benefits).
105. Kelley, 2014 WL 5359745, at *5.
106. Id.
107. 90 Va. Cir. 29, 36 (2015).
108. Rieger, 90 Va. Cir. at 31 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(C)).

2019]

PHANTOM INCOME

383

whether “phantom income” is included.109 After surveying
some of the case law, the court concluded that “a forgivable
loan, given to Defendant as a benefit of his employment,
constitutes gross income for purposes of calculating child
support.”110 The court compared the loan to a bonus or
income, both of which would be includible under the
statute.111 Stated otherwise, “this amount of money
constitutes nonmonetary income to the Defendant. This is a
benefit that Defendant receives because of his employment
and as compensation for his services.”112 Astutely, the court
added, ‘“loan forgiveness’ saves Defendant an amount of
money every month that he would otherwise spend repaying
the ‘loan.’”113
3. In re Marriage of Kirk
In In re Marriage of Kirk, the husband formerly owned
an automobile dealership; he had a large outstanding debt to
the dealership and entered into a contract with the new
owners for repayment of the debt.114 Based on the agreement,
the husband was entitled to an annual bonus which would
then be automatically used to reduce the indebtedness.115
The trial court determined that it would not consider as part
of the husband’s gross income amounts attributable to debt
reduction owed to an employer.116 The ex-wife appealed.117
The California Court of Appeals framed the issue as
“[w]e are here faced with a contractual shift of disposable
income from child support to the payment of third party
109. Id. at 32.
110. Id. at 36.
111. Id. at 36–37.
112. Id. at 37.
113. Id.
114. 266 Cal. Rptr. 76, 77 (Ct. App. 1990).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 77.
117. Id.
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debt.”118 In the very next sentence, the court concluded, “[o]n
its face, this is not permissible.”119 The court reasoned that
“an indebted parent cannot escape liability for the
paramount obligation to support the parent’s children
because of indebtedness such parent has created.” 120 The
court described the arrangement as “a contractual obligation
to shift $4,450 per month, from total gross income of $9,450
per month, from funds available for child support to the
repayment of debt.”121 Importantly, “[t]here is nothing to
suggest that this obligation was sham, unenforceable or
undertaken as a ruse to avoid child support.”122
Although the appeals court agreed that, under the
contract, the $4,450 was not available to pay child support,
“[t]he error of the court was in failing to consider that the
only rational inference derivable from the paperwork before
the court was that this shift was a voluntary diversion of
income to pay debt, resulting in deprivation of funds for child
support.”123 The court therefore reversed the trial court and
explained its rationale as follows:
Were we to sanction this sort of transaction we can envision all
manner of special contracts, with employers or others who owe
money to a supporting parent, which shift funds from available
income to utilization for other purposes benefiting the parent (such
as savings plans, retirement plans, miscellaneous fringe benefits),
resulting in the contention that the support order must be
reduced.124

4. Riddle v. Riddle
In Riddle v. Riddle, a California court was confronted

118. Id. at 81.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Muldrow, 132 Cal. Rptr. 48, 52 (Ct. App.
1976)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 82.
124. Id.
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with the divergence between concepts of cash flow and
income.125 The husband was a financial advisor, and as part
of his compensation, he was given an advance against his
future earnings.126 That amount, though, was periodically
forgiven and treated as discharge-of-indebtedness income by
his employer.127 The court explained this system as follows:
“The reason for this convoluted system of payment is fairly
obvious: It allowed the employer to pay Husband big bucks
up front, but spread out the payment of tax on the payment
over time so as to circumvent the progressivity of the tax
codes.”128
The court rejected the husband’s argument that his
income for support purposes should equal his “cash flow.”129
The court noted, “[w]hile we recognize that family lawyers
and forensic accountants sometimes use the phrase ‘cash
flow’ as a sloppy synonym for the word ‘income’ as it appears
in the support statutes, it isn’t.”130 Indeed, the court
emphasized that, for child-support purposes, the term
income “was ‘lifted’ straight from the Internal Revenue
Code.”131 Therefore, it continued, “[t]hat means that if the
tax laws say you have income because of the forgiveness-ofdebt, you have income, and that forgiveness-of-debt income
must go into the calculation of adjusted gross income under
[the California child-support statutes].”132 Now, the
California child-support statutes did offer some deductions
from income—such as for job-related expenses133—but, as
the court emphasized, “that doesn’t mean that so-called
125. 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 273 (Ct. App. 2005).
126. Id. at 275.
127. Id.; see I.R.C. § 108 (2012).
128. Riddle, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 275.
129. Id. at 276.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 276–77.
133. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4059(f) (West 2019).
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‘phantom’ income as imputed by the tax laws is any less
‘income[.]’”134
5. Poitinger v. Poitinger
The appellant in Poitinger v. Poitinger argued that he
had never actually received the cash amounts reported to
him on a Form K-1, although he acknowledged that those
amounts were includible as income for tax purposes. 135 The
Ohio Court of Appeals, with little discussion, rejected that
argument; the court summarily noted that
[w]hile Appellant introduced tax records in support of his claim,
Appellant has cited no authority in support of his argument, and
[the Ohio statute on award and modification of spousal support] is
silent as to whether ‘phantom income’ should be included in a
party’s gross income for the purpose of calculating spousal
support.136

Because there could also be concerns of income
manipulation, the court ruled that “[t]he trial court was in a
better position than [the court of appeals] to make the
credibility assessments essential to such a determination.”137
6. Cyr v. Cyr
In Cyr v. Cyr,138 the issue was whether a living cost
differential,139 an expatriate premium,140 and a hypothetical

134. Riddle, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 277.
135. Poitinger v. Poitinger, 2005-Ohio-2680, at ¶ 18.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Cyr v. Cyr, 2005-Ohio-504.
139. This payment was designed to “enable employees to maintain a lifestyle
which is broadly comparable to that in their home country, taking account of
differences in cost-of-living, taxation and social security. . . . [A] living-costdifferential (LCD) is paid in order to protect the purchasing power of the
employee’s income in the host location.” Id. ¶ 28.
140. This payment was designed to “recognize the disruption an employee, and
their [sic] accompanying family, experience as a result of an international
assignment, and as a contribution to costs not addressed elsewhere.” Id. ¶ 29.
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tax payment141 made by an employer were includible as
income for support payment calculations. The husband
argued that “these payments and deductions are not part of
his gross pay because they exist only to equalize his pay to
what he would receive for the same work in the U.S.”142
The court noted that the governing child-support statute
defined gross income as “the total of all earned and unearned
income from all sources during a calendar year, whether or
not the income is taxable. . . .”143 Although the statute lists
various items of income, the court noted that “[i]t does not
limit sources of income to the types listed.”144 The court
concluded that, “[a]lthough the purpose of the extra
payments husband received over and above his base salary
was to equalize husband’s salary to its net worth in the U.S.,
they still qualify as income received.”145
7. In re Marriage of Stress
In this case,146 the father appealed an order modifying
his support payments to include expatriate payments.147 The
expatriate payments included (1) a foreign-services
premium, designed to offset the cost of living in the foreign
locale, and (2) the payment of the foreign country taxes,
described as a tax equalization payment.148 The Colorado
141. This payment is “actually a deduction taken from the employee’s check,
similar to the withholding taken from an American company’s paycheck, to cover
taxes incurred by the employee in both his home country as well as the host
country.” Id. ¶ 30.
142. Id.¶ 31.
143. Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.01(C)(7)).
144. Cyr v. Cyr, 2005-Ohio-504, at ¶ 34.
145. Id. The court further explained that “[w]e understand that this extra
income was intended to make his pay substantially equivalent in his host country
to what it would be in his home country. Nonetheless, there is no statutory
allowance for exempting this income from his gross income for child support
calculations.” Id.
146. In re Marriage of Stress, 939 P.2d 500 (Colo. App. 1997).
147. Id. at 501.
148. Id.
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statute for child support defined gross income as “income
from ‘any source,’ with the limited and specified exclusion of
funds received from public assistance or voluntary overtime
pay.”149
The father argued that “the tax equalization payment is
only ‘phantom income’ which is not reasonably available to
him for child-support payments and, thus, is not properly
included in his gross income for child support purposes.”150
The court disagreed, and held that “the tax equalization
payment constituted a lump-sum addition to salary to offset
a lump-sum withholding tax.”151 The court noted, “[t]hat
[the] father did not actually receive the lump-sum payment
prior to its submission to the Canadian tax authorities is no
different in effect from the more common system of
incremental withholding for tax purposes. . . .”152 Indeed, the
court emphasized that the Colorado support statute “does
not provide for deduction of federal and state income taxes or
FICA taxes in computing gross income for purposes of
calculating child support.”153 The court found no authority
“that would require an inconsistent treatment of [the]
father’s Canadian income taxes.”154
8. Marron v. Marron
In this case,155 the husband appealed the trial court’s
determination of his income for spousal and child support.156
The husband owned several corporations, all of which were
149. Id. at 502 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115(7)(a) (1996 cum. supp.));
see also In re Marriage of Campbell, 905 P.2d 19, 20 (Colo. App. 1995); In re
Marriage of Tessmer, 903 P.2d 1194 (Colo. App. 1995) (noting that exceptions are
provided in the statute).
150. Stress, 939 P.2d at 502.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Marron v. Marron, 2014-Ohio-2121.
156. Id. ¶ 9.
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taxed as S corporations.157 The husband argued that the trial
court erred by including the phantom income from the S
corporations in the support calculations—in particular, “that
the K-1 income retained by the corporations should not be
included in his income because he did not receive it, he had
no legal right to demand it, and he had never received any
cash distribution from these companies with the exception of
a tax draw in later years.”158
Here, the support statute defined gross income as:
the total of all earned and unearned income from all sources during
a calendar year, whether or not the income is taxable, and includes
income from salaries, wages, overtime pay, and bonuses to the
extent described in [Section 3119.05(D) of the statute];
commissions; royalties; tips; rents; dividends; severance pay;
pensions; interest . . . and all other sources of income. ‘Gross income’
includes . . . self-generated income; and potential cash flow from
any source.159

Furthermore, the support statute defined the term “selfgenerated income” as “gross receipts received by a parent
from . . . [a] closely held corporation, and rents minus
ordinary and necessary expenses incurred by the parent in
generating the gross receipts.”160
The appeals court sustained the trial court’s judgment to
include the K-1 income. The court reasoned that “whether or
not Husband received a cash distribution from the K-1
income, the retained K-1 income increased Husband’s wealth
through his ownership interest in the companies.”161
Moreover, the court also explained that:
There was evidence that Husband exercised significant control over
the companies. Husband was able to convince his father to make
distributions from the family-owned corporations to cover the tax
liabilities associated with the K-1 income contrary to the previous
157. Id. ¶ 3.
158. Id. ¶ 9.
159. Id. ¶ 12 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.01(C)(7)).
160. Id. (quoting § 3119.01(C)(13)).
161. Id. ¶ 22.
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custom. The “tax distributions” were significantly larger than taxes
due on the K-1 income. Further, Wife testified that Husband’s
family had shaped the companies to minimize a spouse’s support
obligation in a divorce.162

B. Analysis of the Case Law
As the above demonstrates, there are several key issues
present in most of the cases, the chief of which is the
statutory construction surrounding the term “gross income”
or “income” in the state support statute. Another issue and
concern raised by the courts is the specter of financial
gamesmanship by the recipient of the phantom income—i.e.,
intentionally not receiving cash to save on the support
obligation. These issues will be discussed in turn.
1. Using the Federal Tax Definition of Income
The goal in interpreting any statute is to “[give] effect to
the text that the lawmakers have adopted.”163 A key
interpretation canon is the supremacy-of-text principle,
which provides that “[t]he words of a governing text are of
paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context,
is what the text means.”164 Effectuating that goal, moreover,
the ordinary-meaning canon provides “[w]ords are to be
understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the
context indicates that they bear a technical sense.”165 This
canon, then, introduces an interesting wrinkle to the
interpretation analysis: Should the term “income” (and
related terms) in support statutes be construed in the
“everyday” sense of the word, or in its technical federal tax

162. Id.
163. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 29 (2012); see also Timothy M. Todd, The Tail that Wags the Dog:
The Problem of Pre-Merit-Decision Interim Fees and Moral Hazard in the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 63 KAN. L. REV. 1, 27 (2014).
164. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 163, at 56.
165. Id. at 69 (emphasis added). Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner further wrote
that “[t]he ordinary-meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic rule of
interpretation.” Id.
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meaning? Naturally, different states define “income”
differently for support purposes.166
Well, that issue raises another sensible question: Are
those two definitions (the everyday definition of “income” and
the technical tax definition of “income”) even different?
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “income,” as
relevant here, as “a gain or recurrent benefit [usually]
measured in money that derives from capital or labor; also:
the amount of such gain received in a period of time.”167 The
Oxford English Dictionary defines “income” as “[t]hat which
comes in as the periodical produce of one’s work, business,
lands, or investments (considered in reference to its amount,
and commonly expressed in terms of money); annual or
periodical receipts accruing to a person or corporation;
revenue.”168
Those definitions are different, at least at the margins.
Interestingly, the federal tax definition of income has not
enjoyed a static definition; actually, quite the opposite is
true. The genesis for the modern federal income tax is the
Sixteenth Amendment, which was passed in 1913.169 It
provides that “[t]he Congress shall have the power to lay and
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.”170 A few years
later, the Supreme Court addressed the tax concept of
“income” in Eisner v. Macomber.171
In Eisner, the Court was confronted with the issue of
whether “Congress has the power to tax, as income of the
166. See, e.g., DETERMINATION OF INCOME FOR CALCULATING CHILD SUPPORT, 50
STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS: FAMILY LAW: CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT (2018),
Westlaw 0080 Surveys 5.
167. Income, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
168. Income, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
169. See BURKE & FRIEL, supra note 94, at 5.
170. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
171. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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stockholder and without apportionment, a stock dividend
made lawfully and in good faith against profits accumulated
by [a] corporation . . . .”172 The Court described income as
“the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained
through a sale or conversion of capital assets.”173 The Court
concluded, in effect, that because the shareholder received
“nothing out of the company’s assets for his separate use and
benefit[,]” the stock dividend was not income.174
A few years after Macomber, the Board of Tax Appeals
further explained the concept of income for taxing purposes.
In Hawkins v. Commissioner, in deciding whether a
settlement for libel and slander is taxable, the Board noted:
it is conceivable that since the income tax is primarily an
application of the idea of measuring taxes by financial ability to pay,
as indicated by the net accretions to one’s economic wealth during
the year, there may be cases in which taxable income will be
judicially found although outside the precise scope of the description
already given.175

The modern and most famous tax definition of income is
found in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass.176 In Glenshaw,
the Court was confronted with the question of whether the
receipt of antitrust exemplary damages constituted gross
income.177 Noting that Congress desired to exert “the full
measure of its taxing power,”178 the Court held that the
damages were gross income because they represented

172. Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 207 (internal quotations omitted).
174. Id. at 211. A stock dividend does not change a shareholder’s investment
in a company; it merely redistributes his current investment among a different
number of shares—i.e., the total investment remains the same.
175. 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1024 (1927).
176. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
177. Id. at 427.
178. Id. at 429; see also Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940);
Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216, 223 (1937); Douglas v.
Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935); Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 166 (1925).
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“instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete
dominion.”179 Under Glenshaw, a pure windfall—even one
divorced from one’s capital or labor, contrary to Macomber—
is income subject to taxation.180 Despite departing from
Macomber’s capital and labor distinction, Glenshaw still
retained the historical realization requirement.181
Some differences exist between the dictionary definitions
and the tax definition of income. Consider, for example,
Merriam-Webster’s definition, which is effectively the
Macomber definition. However, under Macomber and
Merriam-Webster, the antitrust damages would not be
income, as they do not originate from capital or labor.
Similarly, it does not appear as though the Oxford definition
would capture Glenshaw’s damages either, as they did not
arise from “one’s work, business, lands, or investments . . . .”
Also interesting is that neither dictionary definition
contemplates the realization element, which is expressed in
Glenshaw’s definition for something to be income. The
realization concept “was developed soon after the ratification
of the sixteenth amendment and the passage of the Tariff Act
of 1913.”182 In its early form, the realization requirement
meant that “appreciation in the value of an asset does not
constitute income under the sixteenth amendment in the
absence of an event that separates the appreciation from the
related capital.”183 Normally, this event occurs with a sale or

179. Glenshaw, 348 U.S. at 431.
180. See Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX
REV. 295, 301 (2011) (“Because windfalls do not proceed from the recipient’s labor
or capital or both combined, the punitive damages received by Glenshaw Glass
could not be income under the Macomber definition . . . .”).
181. Id. at 303 (“The Glenshaw Glass definition preserves the realization
requirement but is broad enough to encompass windfall gains . . . .”).
182. Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner:
Refining the Concept of Realization, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 439 (1991)
(footnotes omitted).
183. Id. at 439–40.
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disposition of property.184
A classic realization case is Helvering v. Horst.185 The
Supreme Court explained:
Admittedly not all economic gain of the taxpayer is taxable income.
From the beginning the revenue laws have been interpreted as
defining ‘realization’ of income as the taxable event, rather than the
acquisition of the right to receive it. And ‘realization’ is not deemed
to occur until the income is paid. But the decisions and regulations
have consistently recognized that receipt in cash or property is not
the only characteristic of realization of income to a taxpayer on the
cash receipts basis. Where the taxpayer does not receive payment
of income in money or property realization may occur when the last
step is taken by which he obtains the fruition of the economic gain
which has already accrued to him.186

Stated simply, not all economic gains are taxable gross
income because the gain is not yet realized in tangible form.
The simplest example is year-to-year fluctuations in stock
owned by a taxpayer; those fluctuations are not income (in
the tax sense); the “income” for tax purposes arises only
when that stock is sold or otherwise disposed, i.e., when there
is a realization event.187
2. Economic Definitions of Income
Yet another wrinkle in defining income is that
economists have an entirely different definition of income
than tax attorneys do. Probably the most famous economic
view of income is that of Robert Haig and Henry Simons,
referred to as the Haig-Simons definition of income.188
Robert Haig first proposed the definition of income as
[T]he increase or accretion in one’s power to satisfy his wants in a
given period in so far as that power consists of (a) money itself, or
(b) anything susceptible of valuation in terms of money. More
simply stated, the definition of income which the economist offers is
184. See I.R.C. § 1001 (2012).
185. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
186. Id. at 115.
187. I.R.C. § 1001.
188. See Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 180, at 304.
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this: Income is the money value of the net accretion to one’s economic
power between two points of time.189

Henry Simons published his definition—considered a
refinement of Haig’s definition—which defined income as
“the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised
in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store
of property rights between the beginning and end of the
period in question.”190 As Simons further noted, “in other
words, [income] is merely the result obtained by adding
consumption during the period to ‘wealth’ at the end of the
period and then subtracting ‘wealth’ at the beginning.”191 As
tax commentators have argued, the Haig-Simons broad
definition “allows it to serve the goal of raising maximum
revenue while also being maximally equitable and efficient
and therefore serving two important tax policy objectives.”192
In effect, Haig-Simons includes all accessions to wealth,
whether realized or not.193
3. The Wrinkle of Exemptions
Another issue that could readily arise is, does strict tax
incorporation apply in other contexts? What about an item of
income that is exempted for tax purposes—does that
exemption carry over into the support context? Section 102
is the most basic example.
Section 102 provides that “[g]ross income does not
include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or inheritance.”194 Therefore, gifts are not subject to
189. Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig, ed., 1921); see also Christopher
H. Hanna, Tax Theories and Tax Reform, 59 SMU L. REV. 435, 437 (2006).
190. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938); see also Abreu
& Greenstein, supra note 180, at 304; Hanna, supra note 189, at 437.
191. SIMONS, supra note 192, at 50; see also Hanna, supra note 189, at 437. See
generally Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 180.
192. Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 180, at 304.
193. See id.
194. I.R.C. § 102(a) (2012).
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income tax,195 so received gifts would never show on the Form
1040 of an individual recipient. Nevertheless, gifts are
undoubtedly increases in economic assets (increases in the
store of property rights, à la Haig-Simons). How, then,
should gifts factor into the phantom-income analysis for
domestic support obligations? If the strict incorporation
argument wins the day—arguing that tax definitions
control—gifts are not an item of income. From a policy
perspective, though, this seems incongruous, as a gift
represents an increase in assets that could be shared with
the payees.
Section 121 is another prime example. Section 121
provides that “[g]ross income shall not include gain from the
sale or exchange of property if, during the 5-year period
ending on the date of the sale or exchange, such property has
been owned and used by the taxpayer as the taxpayer’s
principal residence for periods aggregating 2 years or
more.”196 This exclusion is limited to either $250,000 or
$500,000 of gain, depending on the taxpayer’s filing status.197
Consider the example, then, of a recently divorced person
who sells his or her home for $300,000, having purchased it
many years ago for $100,000. Of the $200,000 in economic
gain,198 none of it is taxable due to the operation of section
121.
From an economic (Haig-Simons) or colloquial
perspective, the $200,000 seems like income, but from a tax
perspective, no gross income is involved (due to the statutory
exclusion). Which definition should control? Do the same
rationales that support the section 121 exclusion—namely,
providing for a fluid and dynamic housing market (reducing
barriers to selling one’s home)—justify not including the

195. There could, of course, be gift taxes that are owed primarily by the donor.
196. I.R.C. § 121(a).
197. I.R.C. § 121(b)(1)–(2).
198. That is, the amount realized from the transaction less the basis (i.e.,
investment in the property).
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profits from the sale in support calculations?
Section 74 is also relevant. This section provides that
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, or in section
117 (relating to qualified scholarships), gross income
includes amounts received as prizes and awards.”199 This
restates the general rule in Glenshaw and section 61: all
accessions to wealth, clearly realized, are gross income.
However, due to various (largely political) reasons, section
74(d) then provides “[g]ross income shall not include the
value of any medal awarded in, or any prize money received
from the United States Olympic Committee on account of,
competition in the Olympic Games or Paralympic Games.”200
On a net basis, then, an Olympic award is not gross
income for tax purposes, but should it be considered income
for support purposes? Do the same political reasons that
underline the tax exclusion justify an exclusion for domestic
support purposes? The answer is likely “no.”
4. The Wrinkle of Administrative Practicalities
Despite section 61 and Glenshaw Glass’s broad reach,
the government has administratively retracted it in part.
One such example is the general welfare exception (GWE).201
Under this doctrine, “some government payments do not
constitute gross income to the recipients.”202 For example,
“the classic example of the GWE’s application is a
government payment made to victims of a natural
disaster.”203 The general welfare exception first appeared in
1938, “when the IRS determined that welfare payments
(from the then-recently enacted Social Security Act) could be
199. I.R.C. § 74.
200. I.R.C. § 74(d)(1). But see id. § 74(d)(2) (limiting the exclusion to taxpayers
with AGI of $1,000,000 or less).
201. See generally Robert W. Wood & Richard C. Morris, The General Welfare
Exception to Gross Income, 109 TAX NOTES 203 (2005); Robert W. Wood, Updating
General Welfare Exception Authorities, 123 TAX NOTES 1443 (2009).
202. Wood & Morris, supra note 201, at 203.
203. Id.
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excluded from gross income.”204 The IRS, moreover, has
expressly invoked the general welfare exception. For
example, in Revenue Ruling 63-163, the IRS determined:
Benefit payments made under the Area Redevelopment Act and the
Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 are intended to
aid the recipients in their efforts to acquire new skills that will
enable them to obtain better employment opportunities, and, as
such, fall in the same category as other unemployment relief
payments made for the promotion of the general welfare.205

Indeed, the IRS has explained the general welfare
exception as follows: “[P]ayments under legislatively
provided social benefit programs for the promotion of general
welfare are not includible in an individual’s gross income.”206
The general welfare exception elements are that the
payments must “(1) be made from a governmental general
welfare fund; (2) be for the promotion of the general welfare
(i.e., on the basis of need rather than to all residents without
regard to, for example, financial status, health, educational
background, or employment status) and (3) not be made with
respect to services rendered by the recipient.”207
Another income exception, and one that is incredibly ad
hoc, occurs when the IRS pronounces that a certain item will
not be considered income, even though it otherwise fits
within Glenshaw and section 61’s definition. A classic
example is the treatment of frequent flyer miles earned
through business travel.208 The IRS has basically thrown in
the towel on trying to tax these items. In Announcement
2002-18, the IRS stated that “[c]onsistent with prior practice,
the IRS will not assert that any taxpayer has understated
his federal tax liability by reason of the receipt or personal
204. Id. at 204 (citing I.T. 3194, 1938-1 C.B. 114 and I.T. 3230, 1938-2 C.B.
136). But see I.R.C. § 86 (including, in part, social security benefits).
205. Rev. Rul. 63-136, 1963-2 C.B. 19 (emphasis added).
206. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200021036 (May 26, 2000).
207. Id.
208. For example, a business traveler earns “points” that can then be used on
personal travel.
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use of frequent flyer miles or other in-kind promotional
benefits attributable to the taxpayer’s business or official
travel.”209 Under Glenshaw Glass, though, these items seem
to be “accessions to wealth” and are “clearly realized” (that
is, something of value that the taxpayer has control over).
Are they still gross income in the context of domestic support
obligations?
As demonstrated, then, there are now at least three
different operable definitions of income: (1) the colloquial
meaning, (2) the tax attorney’s definition, and (3) the
economist’s definition. However, just arriving at a general
definition does not solve the issue, as the tax attorney
definition has even more wrinkles, many of which have not
been contemplated by the phantom-income cases.
Consequently, it is unwise and possibly over- or underinclusive to simply incorporate the full tax literature and
concepts of income into the domestic support analysis, as the
two contexts are not necessarily coterminous.
5. Phantom Income Ipse Dixit
Another issue is that the cases and litigants sometimes
call things phantom income that are not phantom income in
reality—at least not from the perspective of a tax attorney.
This muddies the waters and makes it harder to clarify and
resolve true cases of phantom income.
Consider Cyr v. Cyr, which considered the effect of a
living cost differential, an expatriate premium, and a
hypothetical tax payment on the support obligation.210 The
husband argued that these items constituted phantom
income.211 The court explained the hypothetical tax payment
as basically a withholding requirement, noting “[t]hat
although the employee never receives it, it is still gross

209. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18.
210. 2005-Ohio-504, at ¶ 4.
211. Id.
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income to the employee.”212 Withholdings are not phantom
income. Withholdings are not received by the taxpayer
because they are paid to another to satisfy the taxpayer’s
obligation to the payee. Stated otherwise, cash is transferred
in these situations, just not to the wage earner; in true
phantom-income cases, there is no present cash transfer to
any payee.
Similarly, in In re Marriage of Stress, the court
considered an equalization payment, which the father
argued constituted phantom income.213 The equalization
payment was “credited in a lump sum to father’s final
paycheck each year, and at the same time deducted for
payment of father’s Canadian income taxes.”214 The father
argued that such a payment is “not reasonably available to
him for child support payments and, thus, is not properly
included in his gross income for child support purposes.”215
Again, the court did not argue with the classification of the
payment as phantom income. Even though the court
concluded that the amounts were income for support
purposes, it missed an opportunity to clarify whether or not
such amounts are classified properly as “phantom.”
In both of the above cases, employers actually
transferred cash, even though the wage earners were not the
ultimate payees (the taxing authorities were). This is
markedly different from the prototypical Schedule K-1 passthrough phantom income (pure phantom income), when an
entity has (perhaps) accrual taxable income and resultant
pass-through income, with potentially no actual cash
transfer. For example, if a corporate customer buys goods on
credit from an accrual-basis corporation, that corporation
has income that is taxable, even though no cash actually
changes hands. In the case of a pass-through entity, the
212. Id. ¶ 30.
213. 939 P.2d 500, 502 (Colo. App. 1997).
214. Id. at 501.
215. Id. at 502.
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owner would need to report that income, even though no cash
is involved (only potential future cash is involved).
6. Timing Asymmetries
At bottom, there appear to be at least two time-based
issues that need to be resolved in connection with the timing
asymmetry between cash receipt and income inclusion
(particularly when incorporating tax principles). First, there
are situations in which cash was received in the past, but the
“income” occurs now; for example, cancellation of debt
income (henceforth Category 1 asymmetries). Second, there
are situations in which the income occurs now, but cash may
(or may not) be received in the future, such as pass-through
business income (henceforth Category 2 asymmetries). The
judicial and charging-order-type remedies will consider these
timing asymmetries.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE PHANTOM INCOME ISSUE IN DOMESTIC
SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS CONTEXT
This Article addresses two possible solutions to the
phantom income issue in the domestic support context. The
first is to keep the status quo rule that implicitly (and
sometimes explicitly) incorporates the tax definition of
income and includes phantom income in support
calculations; the second is to implement a charging-ordertype remedy to balance the concerns of payors and payees
vis-à-vis phantom income.
A. Incorporating Tax Definitions
The first option is simply to incorporate federal tax
definitions of income into the phantom income/domestic
support obligation context. As the case survey demonstrates,
this is the apparent majority rule,216 and naturally, this is

216. That is, of the cases surveyed in this Article, seven of them included
phantom income as income for DSO purposes and one did not. (This Article does
not purport to be an exhaustive survey of all related cases.)
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the simplest and easiest option. However, this solution does
not truly solve the two categories of asymmetry, nor does it
solve the other issues identified earlier when incorporating
tax principles—i.e., the tax-incorporation option does not
provide clear answers to issues such as tax exclusions,
administrative exclusions, and other issues that are specific
to tax policy and administration but have no analog in
domestic support contexts.
Consider, for example, the cancellation-of-indebtedness
income example. When the loan (and its cash) is extended,
no taxable income results, because there was no accession to
wealth.217 Although the taxpayer’s assets were increased by
the amount of the cash borrowed, this gain was offset by the
increased loan liability. If the loan is later forgiven (in whole
or in part), the Code includes in gross income the difference
between the loaned amount and that forgiven.218
It may even be the case that the family did benefit from
the cash (when it was not taxed as loan proceeds) if the loan
was extended pre-separation—that is, if the family had the
opportunity to consume it. To also include the COD income
post-separation for domestic support obligations would be
akin to double consumption by the DSO payee; that is, they
were able to consume the loan proceeds and then also
consume the later-in-time DSO payment. In sum, there are
asymmetries and timing differences between taxation and
consumption that would result from total incorporation of
tax principles in DSO calculations.
Moreover, tax concepts may cut both ways and may
actually work to the disadvantage of DSO payees in certain
situations in which the tax and DSO policies diverge.
Consider, for example, the inequity of a whole incorporation
of tax concepts when factoring in exclusions. Gifts are
income-tax free,219 but represent a true asset (or cash)
217. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
218. Unless an exception applies. See I.R.C. § 108 (2012).
219. I.R.C. § 102(a).

2019]

PHANTOM INCOME

403

increase. In the main, the receipt of a gift represents
additional assets a family could use for consumption but that
are outside the definition of gross income. Similarly, Roth
IRA distributions—which are received tax-free if planned
properly—are designed to be used as retirement
consumption but are outside the definition of gross income.
In both cases, though, those funds could readily be consumed
by the family. In sum, a strict incorporation of tax concepts
does not solve all the phantom-income issues and related
issues. Fortunately, there are cases that recognize that
income for tax purposes and income for DSO purposes
(especially for child support) are not coterminous.220
B. Charging-Order Type Remedy
Another solution is for legislatures to embrace a
charging-order-type remedy specific for domestic support
obligations. A charging order refers to “the discrete remedy
of diverting distributions attributable to the interest charged
to the creditor until the amount owed is satisfied. . . .”221
Under a charging order, when cash distributions are made
from the entity, the distributions for the debtor-member are
paid to the holder of the charging order (the creditor). The
220. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 37, § 4.03; see also In re Marriage of Fain,
794 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Colo. App. 1990) (“[The guideline], by its plain language,
also includes all payments from a financial resource, whatever the source thereof.
In addition, the more specific definition of ‘gross income’ in [the guideline]
prevails over other definitions for federal and state income purposes.”);
Cummings v. Cummings, 897 P.2d 685, 687 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (“Because the
Guidelines are based upon assumptions about spending patterns of families at
various income levels, gross income for child support purposes is not determined
by the gross income shown on the parties’ income tax returns, but rather on the
actual money or cash-like benefits received by the household which is available
for expenditures.”); In re Marriage of Moorthy & Arjuna, 2015 IL App (1st)
132077, ¶ 38, 29 N.E.3d 604, 616 (“‘[I]ncome’ for purposes of child support
determinations may include ‘a variety of payments [that] will qualify as “income”
for purposes of section 505(a)(3) of the Act that would not be taxable as income
under the Internal Revenue Code,’ which is designed to achieve different
purposes than the child support provisions of the Act.”).
221. PETER SPERO, ASSET PROTECTION: LEGAL PLANNING, STRATEGIES
FORMS, ¶ 9.02 (2019).
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charging order arose under partnership law to balance the
need of the creditor to attach assets of the debtor (like the
partnership interest), while reducing the disruption to the
underlying business; such an order prevents the creditor
from asserting management or control rights.222
Interestingly, the issues faced by creditors of LLC
members are similar to the issues faced by former spouses in
the above-mentioned cases. For example, the debtor (i.e., the
LLC member) can have taxable income (such as partnership
income flow-through) but may not necessarily have a
corresponding cash distribution. This is similar to the
situation of the debtor former spouse who has potentially
phantom income without a corresponding cash flow. A
related concern is the issue of cash gamesmanship; that is,
the LLC—which may be controlled completely by the
debtor—may decide to not distribute cash for fear it will be
collected by a creditor. This concern has been raised in the
above cases as well.
Consequently, the presence of a charging-order-type
remedy specific to domestic support obligations could provide
a common-sense solution in complex scenarios, balancing the
competing claims of increased taxable income and uncertain
cash flow. A charging-order-type remedy is ideal in Category
2 situations—those in which there is the potential for a cash
flow in the future. The charging order can be applied against
the source of that potential future cash flow.
In the partnership/LLC context, the charging order is
applied specifically, i.e., with respect to a particular business
entity. Such a clean demarcation is not always present in the
domestic support context. However, the remedy could still be
applied in many instances. For example, in the above cases
of Poitinger and Marron, the sources of the phantom income
were actual business entities; thus, a charging order could be
specific to cash distributions from those businesses or from
later stock sales (if the payor is an equity holder).
222. See, e.g., id.
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But what about those cases in which a charging order
cannot be aimed toward a specific asset or business
enterprise? Those cases are more problematic, and the
charging-order remedy may not be an effective fix.223 In such
cases, the court may need to craft a payment schedule after
extensive fact-finding regarding actual changes in cash flow,
if any. It may be that there is a close proxy for an underlying
asset. Consider, for example, Kelley, in which there was COD
income arising out of an employment-based loan. There, the
ex-spouse/payor owned stock in the employer. The charging
order could be directed at cash flows and receipts from the
ex-spouse’s later stock sales of that company.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article addressed the developing intersection
between the federal income-tax concept of phantom income
and its impact on domestic support obligations. As shown,
the tax code and support statutes have different goals and
objectives; thus, a simple incorporation adoption of
equivalent terms and definitions may not be an optimal
solution. In addition, two timing asymmetries highlight the
thorny intersection between tax principles and domestic
support obligations—and in some of the cases, true phantom
income is not even at issue (despite its invocation). This
Article thus suggests a DSO-specific charging-order-type
remedy to help balance the concerns expressed by the case
law. While the charging-order solution may not fit all
circumstances, it nevertheless advances the literature and
provides a workable solution in many true phantom income
cases.
223. In any event, there may be other remedies available depending on state
law, such as a basic lien for support obligations. See generally 24A AM. JUR. 2D
Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 753. However, a basic lien may be a less
elegant solution as it is not necessarily aimed at the specific asset or item
generating the phantom income. In other words, if state law provided, as a matter
of law, a lien for support payments on real property (like it generally does for
judgment creditors), the real property is not generating the basis for modifying
the support payment.

